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A Pilot Project Using EvidenceBased Clinical Pathways And Payment Reform In China's Rural Hospitals Shows Early Success ABSTRACT Reforming China's public hospitals to curb widespread overtreatment and improve the quality and affordability of care has been the most challenging aspect of that nation's ambitious health reform, which began in 2009. This article describes a pilot project under way in several of China's provinces that combines payment reform with the implementation of evidence-based clinical pathways at a few hospitals serving rural areas. Results to date include reduced length-of-stay and prescription drug use and higher patient and provider satisfaction. These early results suggest that the pilot may be achieving its goals, which may have far-reaching and positive implications for China's ongoing reform. I n 2009 China embarked upon a major reform of its health system, which had been thrown into disarray by the market-oriented overall economic "reform and opening" that began in 1978. Under that market reform, the Chinese government had greatly reduced financial support for the country's public hospitals, setting them adrift to fend for themselves in the new market environment. By the early 2000s government spending on health care had shrunk to 15.5 percent of total national health spending, down from the previous level of 30 percent. 1 Hospitals responded to this new environment by allowing the need for revenue and profits to influence the treatments they dispensed.
Although hospitals were still bound by government-set fees, many of which did not cover costs, the government allowed hospitals to earn markups of 15-30 percent on some services charged to patients or health insurerssuch as tests, imaging, and the dispensing of drugs. As a result, treatments were tilted toward high-margin services, and overtreatment of patients became a serious problem. 2 Part of China's health reform that was begun in 2009 is a reform of public hospitals to refocus them toward the public purpose they should serve and away from what health minister Chen Zhu has openly called "profit chasing." An accompanying goal is to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of their services. This article focuses on that initiative-specifically, on a pilot study exploring payment reform in China's county-level public hospital sector and the use of evidence-based clinical pathways. These pathways are clinical protocols for the treatment of specific diseases or medical conditions, described in further detail below.
China's New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme
As part of expanding health insurance coverage under health reform, China established its New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme for rural residents in 2003. By 2012 the scheme covered 97.5 percent of China's rural population, or approximately 832 million people. 3 In 2009, 80.46 percent of the rural insurance scheme's funds were spent on inpatient care, making rural public hospital reform to improve both clinical and cost-effectiveness of medical services the singular most urgent target for fundamental reform. 4 In July 2009 this author presented to Minister The ministry authorized its policy research arm, the China National Health Development Research Center (hereafter National Center), and its Center for Project Supervision and Management to take full charge of the pilot project.
The specific goals pursued with the pilot study were as follows: to improve the quality of care delivered at rural public hospitals by changing providers' behavior through the use of evidencebased clinical pathways; to reduce patients' outof-pocket spending burden by gaining control over rapid increases in health care costs at rural public hospitals; and to increase efficiency in rural public hospitals' use of resources through payment reform and curbing overtreatment so more patients could be served.
An allied goal was to use the evidence-based clinical pathways, once developed, as tools for continuing medical education and the quick dissemination of innovations in best clinical practice. This allied goal is especially important for rural hospitals, where the quality of health care is known to be inferior to that of most urban hospitals, which benefit from having greater resources.
If the project were judged to be successful by the Ministry of Health, the next step, according to the design of the pilot project, would be to scale up the initial pilot program to other Health XI Project areas and regions and eventually to introduce the program nationwide.
Project Design The basic approach of the pilot study was to implement, in some rural "pilot" public hospitals, evidence-based clinical pathways and case payments applied to a welldefined set of medical conditions requiring treatment over an episode of care. A fundamental goal was to compare the difference in the cost and quality of services delivered before and after the implementation of clinical pathways.
Another fundamental goal was, where possible, to compare the values taken on by a number of variables over time in the pilot hospitals with those in a number of control hospitals not subject to clinical pathways and case payments, to measure the true impact of clinical pathways and case payments on these variables.
Identifying Target Diseases, Injuries, Conditions, And Procedures In the initial phase of the pilot project, ten single "diseases"-including true clinical diseases as well as certain medical conditions and eventswere chosen by the government as "pilot intervention diseases" for implementation in pilot hospitals. These are common conditions with high prevalence in rural China, established efficacious treatments, and predictable outcomes, and they are relatively costly to treat.
The ten diseases, which are closely watched by China's central government for their common occurrence and associated costs of treatment and quality of care, are uncomplicated appendicitis, benign gall bladder disease, inguinal hernia, vaginal delivery (for infant and maternal safety, the Chinese government encourages delivery in hospitals), cesarean section, cerebral hemorrhage (stroke caused by bleeding in the brain), cerebral infarction (stroke caused by a blood clot), endometriosis, communityacquired pneumonia, and coronary heart disease.
Pilot hospitals were also encouraged to include in the pilot additional diseases and conditions that had high incidence rates among their local populations or that were listed in the local disease registry, provided the hospitals had the technical competency to treat them. Those were designated as "X diseases." For example, one of the pilot hospitals initially chose four additional "X diseases"-simple limb fractures, benign ovarian tumors, chronic cholecystitis acute outbreak (inflammation of the gall bladder and gall stones), and acute purulent appendicitis (discharging pus). 6 Together the battery of ten diseases selected by the government and X diseases selected by participating pilot hospitals was given the term "10+X intervention diseases."
Selecting Pilot Hospitals The hospitals included in the pilot study were chosen because they were capable of implementing clinical pathways and were willing to do so. Thus, the choice of hospitals included in this small-scale study does not qualify as a classic randomized controlled trial. Nor was it thought that the results from this first pilot would be representative of all of China's county-level hospitals, because these pilot hospitals were located in relatively poorer and less developed inland provinces.
The first hospitals to join the pilot project were Hanbin District First Hospital, a 260-bed hospital serving a population of 1.0 million in central China; Chongqing Qiangjiang Central Hospital, a 700-bed hospital serving a population of 530,000 in southwest China; Yiyang County People's Hospital, a 280-bed hospital serving a population of 695,000 in Henan province in central China; and Wuzhi County Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital, a 180-bed general hospital that offers both traditional Chinese medicine and Western medicine treatments, also in Henan province.
All of the pilot hospitals discussed in this article began implementing clinical pathways in fall 2010. Encouraged by preliminary data that emerged from the project, additional hospitals joined the study. As of January 2013, thirteen hospitals in several provinces were participating in the pilot project. 7 Selection criteria for control hospitals were as follows: history, geography, transportation, local gross domestic product by industry tier, local economic growth rate for the past three to five years, number of hospital beds, number of physicians and nurses, hospital revenue, number and distribution of health care institutions in the area, and other factors. In a pilot performance assessment requested by the National Center in June 2011, 8 two matching hospitals for the two hospitals that began the pilot at the earliest date (Hanbin First and Qiangjiang Central) were chosen to serve as control hospitals. The control hospitals all were engaged in teaching and research, and they ranged in size from 160 to 460 beds.
Developing Clinical Pathways A team of China's national clinical experts worked closely with NICE clinical experts to modify the existing clinical pathways that the ministry had already developed for the ten diseases selected for the pilot project. These modified evidence-based clinical pathways and coding based on International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10), became the instruments tested in the early stage of the pilot study.
Clinical pathways often are decried by physicians as "cookbook medicine"-the practice of medicine by strict adherence to clinical practice guidelines, or "cookbooks" that fail to take into account the "art of medicine" 9 and clinical judgment. The Chinese pilot clinical pathways sidestepped that issue by building flexibility into the pilot clinical pathways, which are broken
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Health Affairs by http://content.healthaffairs.org/ down into "required" and "elective" services and other treatment inputs. Physicians have discretion over elective services, as the patients' conditions warrant.
The case payment for each of the clinicalpathway conditions or diseases is fixed, regardless of how many elective services the doctor treating the case delivers to the patient. The fixed payment is designed to block potential overtreatment, because it is clearly not in the physician's financial interest to provide unnecessary services.
During a site visit by the author in the early stage of the pilot (March 2011), doctors complained that clinical pathways encroached upon their autonomy. For example, Qiangjiang Central reported that the clinical pathways for cerebral infarction mandated some daily "required" services that its doctors deemed unnecessary. Over time, however, these problems were solved as medical personnel came to accept the clinical pathways after gaining proficiency in their use or the pathways were revised to reflect local conditions and needs.
Patient Consent And Enrollment Patients must consent to be enrolled in clinical pathway treatment. Upon admission, patients must be informed of the option to enroll in the clinical pathway treatment and shown the particular patient pathway, written specifically for patients for ease of understanding, and the preset outof-pocket payment for their particular disease or condition.
Beyond patients' consent, pilot hospitals were allowed little discretion in enrolling patients for clinical-pathways treatments. Enrollment was based on a set of externally prescribed clinical criteria. Formal justification was required for a decision by attending physicians not to enroll a patient in the clinical pathway. Quality control departments in pilot hospitals engaged in daily monitoring of all incoming new patients for enrollment eligibility.
Setting Case Payments By design, the case payments under the clinical pathways were hospital specific. For example, the case payment for hernia repair is ¥3,100 (about US$473 at 2011 exchange rates) at Hanbin First and ¥5,000 (about US$763) at Qiangjiang Central; and for hemorrhagic stroke, ¥7,000 (about US$1,069) and ¥12,000 (about US$1,832) (China National Health Development Research Center, personal communication, June 18, 2011).
The study was designed to avoid triggering providers' predictable and understandable resistance to changes that entail substantial financial losses for them. To that end, the case payment for a particular disease or condition was set at the eightieth percentile of amounts actually billed for the disease or condition by the hospital during the previous three years. 10 Billing in those years was based on fee-for-service according to fee schedules set by the local health authorities.
Designers of the pilot project believed that although hospitals might earn slightly lower revenues on cases subject to clinical pathways, they would also use fewer real resources-for example, patient days or prescription drugs-per case, thereby freeing up those resources to gain revenue from treating more patients. If, however, that three-year average payment was below the payment level obtained by pricing out the services called for in the clinical pathway at the local fee schedule, then the higher amount was used as a basis for case payment. In such cases, the pathway typically called for more services than had traditionally been rendered in the previous three years. For Qiangjiang Central, for example, the case payment for cerebral infarction and acute simple appendicitis treated through the clinical pathway was higher than the three-year average that had been billed by that hospital before the pilot began (Exhibit 1).
In other cases, however, when heavy overtreatment in prior years was suspected, the case payment was set much below the pre-pilot three-year average fee-for-service billing. For example, for stable angina pectoris, the case payment for Qiangjiang Central was 53.3 percent below the average billing before the pilot began, presumably because of overtreatment (Exhibit 1).
Using a three-year average for billing prior to the pilot minimized the potential that hospitals that knew about the pilot ahead of time would game the system by billing more under fee-forservice in the year prior to the pilot.
Given the manner in which the case payments were set, these payments did not keep the pilot hospitals financially whole for each and every case. The case payment could be somehow below what a particular hospital had billed on average for the case in the three years prior to the pilot. But because the clinical pathways in many cases reduced previous overtreatment-including excessive hospital lengths-of-stay-these pathways helped pilot hospitals reduce the real resource use of treatments-for example, inpatient bed days-thereby freeing up these resources to treat additional (revenue-yielding) patients. So even if case payments were somewhat lower than previous fee-for-service billings, a pilot hospital could still come out ahead financially using the pathways.
Developing IT Systems Developing an integrated information technology system for the pilot project posed a challenge to the program's success. In China, where there is no national health information system, hospitals have their own systems. Working closely with the National Center staff stationed at the pilot hospitals to assist with the implementation of the clinical pathways during the initial stage of the pilot project, information technology experts created interface software for the clinical pathways compatible with existing hospital information systems at pilot hospitals. These new information technology systems enable hospital quality control departments as well as insurance payers (the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme) to monitor care delivery-especially checking for underuse by providers-and quality in real time.
Payment Incentives To stimulate the enthusiasm of the hospital personnel charged with implementing and later operating the clinical pathways, pilot hospitals established incentive schemes that either rewarded or sanctioned clinicians for the roles they play in implementing the clinical pathways. Performance that generated rewards for clinicians included such measures as whether incoming patients were informed about the clinical-pathway treatments option and enrolled in the program, the number of patients enrolled, and the number of clinical pathways developed. Nonfinancial rewards included opportunities for advanced study and public recognition.
On the negative side, hospital medical personnel and departments that failed to perform as expected were subject to sanctions and financial penalties. At Hanbin First, for example, failure to enroll otherwise qualified patients was subject to financial penalties of ¥200 (about US$30) charged to the attending physician and ¥100 (about US$15) charged to the department head. Physicians and department heads were also penalized ¥100 and ¥50, respectively, when patients originally enrolled in the clinical pathways left the program without due justification before treatment ended. 6 At Qiangjiang Central, failure to develop clinical pathways for selected diseases resulted in a ¥200 fine per month for the department head and ¥100 each for the head nurse, deputy head of department, and deputy head nurse.
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Data Collection And Analysis With their new information technology system, pilot hospitals collected data on several metrics. These included the total number of patients admitted into the hospital each day by disease, pathway enrollment, whether or not the patient was successfully treated by clinical pathway protocols, reason for leaving the pathway treatment ("disenrollment"), and discharge. For both pathway and nonpathway patients, to track changes before and after the pathways were implemented, Developing an integrated information technology system for the pilot project posed a challenge to the program's success.
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Health Affairs by http://content.healthaffairs.org/ data were also collected on patients' out-ofpocket spending, patients' conditions upon discharge ("cured," "improved," and so on), fourteen-and thirty-day readmission, hospitalacquired infections, antibiotic use, drug expenditure as percentage of total hospital expenditure, total hospital expenditure, length-of-stay, patient education, patient satisfaction, and health insurance reimbursement statistics.
All field data and reports were submitted to the National Center, which also conducted its own periodic overall project assessments through site visits and reports by both center staff and invited national and international experts and commissioned reports. The first such overall project assessment was conducted in early 2011, and the second, in mid-2012. 7 Based on the data they collected, pilot hospitals performed regular in-house before-and-after analyses on the impact of the clinical pathways using the target variables enumerated above. Researchers at Shandong University and Peking University, one of the two outside groups assisting the National Center, analyzed the data used a difference-in-differences approach.
Site Visits A shortcoming of before-and-after studies based solely on data is that they reveal little about the qualitative processes that actually accompanied the collection of the data. Site visits observing and monitoring these processes can enrich understanding of the data.
This author was invited by the National Center to make two site visits to two pilot hospitals, Hanbin First and Qiangjiang Central, in February-March 2011, as an independent outsider, to evaluate the progress of the pilots, identify problems in the field, and report back to the National Center to suggest warranted changes. During the site visits, the author spoke with heads of hospitals and clinical departments; physicians; nurses; patients; and local government officials, which included payers (administrators of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme), regulators, mayors, and party officials.
There was widespread, across-the-board enthusiasm for the pilot at Hanbin First but a more cautious response at Qiangjiang Central, where there was concern with how pathway implementation might affect hospital revenues (Exhibit 1). The concerns expressed at Qiangjiang Central may have been reflected in the much lower patient pathway enrollment rates at that time, perhaps as a result of the hospital's concern about the negative impact on hospital revenue by the implementation of clinical pathways and subsequent hesitation to enroll patients in clinical pathway treatments.
At Hanbin First, the author learned that when other hospitals in the district learned about the pilot and its results, they were eager to become part of the pilot also. In addition, Hanbin First physicians remarked that they were happy to be able to treat patients by evidence-based clinical pathways and that they benefited professionally from learning about the latest best practices. They also said that the pathways coupled with case payments designed to avoid visiting financial losses on pilot hospitals allowed them to earn their pay without having to distort their clinical behavior in the pursuit of revenue.
The Pilot Program's Preliminary Results
In a January 2013 report, Yu Dezhi, the directorgeneral of the National Center, mentioned five main results from the pilot study to date. 7 He based his assessment on data and analyses generated by the project as of December 2012.
First, although the length-of-stay was longer for a small minority of clinical-pathway patients (for example, those with cerebral infarction), the average length-of-stay for clinical-pathway patients in pilot hospitals declined overall by one to two days.
Second, unnecessary services for clinical-pathway patients were reduced by 20 percent, which led to a decrease in those patients' out-of-pocket spending through lower copayments preset by the insurance payer-the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme-and no extra-case-payment billing by the hospitals.
Third, there was substantial improvement in communications and relations between clinicalpathway patients and medical staff, which has resulted in higher patient and provider satisfaction.
Fourth, there was no reduction in the overall revenues of the participating hospitals.
Fifth, drug spending as a percentage of total clinical-pathway inpatient spending declined.
Before-And-After Studies The hospitals themselves performed before-and-after analyses of their own data. Exhibit 2 provides an illustration of this kind of analysis. Column 2 shows the pre-pilot three-year average of billing based on fees for actual services. Column 3 shows a hypothetical figure-namely, the hospital's billing if the various services under the clinical-pathway treatment had been billed out on a fee-for-service basis at the local fees, instead of being compensated by the case method.
Column 4 (the difference between columns 2 and 3) presents the potential savings per case that payers would have had if the services under the clinical pathways had been priced out (hypothetically) at the local fee-for-service fees. Column 5 presents those savings as a percentage of the three-year average pre-pilot billing.
A positive number in columns 4 and 5 denotes potential savings. A negative number denotes hypothetical added spending under the clinical pathways. Thus, had the services delivered under clinical pathways for acute appendicitis been billed out at the local fee-for-service fees instead of the case payment, then the clinical-pathway treatment actually would have cost the payer ¥102 (approximately US$11.57) more than the three-year pre-pilot billing average.
The numbers in columns 3-5 may be difficult for readers to grasp, because they are counterfactual. They are merely intended to indicate potential savings or extra spending if clinicalpathway treatments were paid at the fee-forservice fees, rather than the preset case payments actually made under the pilot study. As noted earlier, the counterfactual savings shown in column 4 do suggest commensurate lower real resource costs and, thus, real efficiency gains. Because the data from the pilot project suggest substantial reductions in the use of prescription drugs under the clinical pathways, 11,12 a good part of the potential savings figures in column 4 is likely to reflect lower drug usage.
Unfortunately, data on the actual use of real resources by the hospitals and the associated costs to the hospitals were not available for this pilot study, presumably because hospitals do not generate such data. Ideally, one would like to have such data, with costs broken down by direct costs and allocated fixed costs. Direct costs of a given medical treatment denote costs that the hospital would not have incurred had the treatment not been provided.
Difference-In-Differences Analyses One study, performed for the National Center by researchers at Shandong University and Peking University, used a difference-in-differences approach to compare before-pilot and after-pilot data for pilot hospitals with corresponding data for the control hospitals. A comparison of inpatient average lengths-of-stay at Hanbin First and Qiangjiang Central with those of control hospitals found that the clinical pathways reduced average length-of-stay in most categories (Exhibit 3).
A major exception was cerebral infarction, which had a 6.13-day increase in average length-of-stay under clinical-pathway treatment at Hanbin First. Presumably the increase in the length-of-stay was a correction through the clinical pathways of the previous undertreatment of the condition by the physicians at Hanbin First.
From the hospital's perspective, a reduction in average length-of-stay would allow it to treat more patients and earn more revenues. More recent data (November 2012) from Yiyang People's, albeit on a before-and-after analysis only, also showed an overall decline in the average length-of-stay. 13 For most clinical-pathway cases, the difference-in-differences analyses also showed substantial reductions in drug usage and use of laboratory tests under the clinical pathways, relative to pre-pilot use and relative to the control hospitals (data not shown).
In general, the difference-in-differences analysis did not contradict insight from the beforeand-after studies. In any event, both approaches have persuaded China's top policy makers to scale up the use of clinical pathways, coupled with case payment, to all county hospitals.
Satisfaction Rates Patients participating in the clinical-pathway pilot project were informed up front about their detailed treatment plans. They also knew beforehand their total out-ofpocket expense for their entire case. Typically, patients admitted to Chinese hospitals have no way of knowing in advance what their out-ofpocket expenses will be. Patients participating 
in the clinical-pathway pilot project thus benefited from price transparency.
Patients participating in the pilot project also benefited from having choices. The patient, not the hospital, decided whether or not to enroll in the clinical-pathway treatment. One would 12 an eightpercentage-point increase from the patient satisfaction rate prior to the pilot (before October 2010). Qiangjiang Central reported a patient satisfaction rate of 98 percent as of November 2012, also an eight-percentage-point improvement relative to the patient satisfaction rate prior to the pilot (before October 2010).
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The small percentage of patients who expressed dissatisfaction (at Hanbin First) complained about a lack of storage and a lack of bathroom facilities. 6 Obviously, these complaints cannot be considered to be related to the clinical pathways themselves.
Providers' Views Providers at pilot hospitals welcomed the incentive schemes whereby rewards, both monetary and nonmonetary as discussed earlier, were based on clinical-pathway patient enrollment and treatment. These new incentives replaced the past practice of providers' doing everything they could to make money by overtreating patients. The new incentives allowed providers to earn a reasonable income through treating patients by strict adherence to evidence-based clinical pathways. 2 Providers at pilot hospitals viewed this arrangement as a legitimate and legal way to be compensated for the value of their labor. They said that although they earned a little less, they were at peace and felt good about the arrangement. 2 Payer Satisfaction The New Rural Cooperative Medical Schemes, which pay providers, also were satisfied with the pilot's case payment approach. Paying hospitals by case payments instead of by fee-for-service gave the National Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme greater control over and certainty about its expenditures. As payer, the scheme can now set budgets to plan the use of its funds based on actual expenditure data.
2,14

Discussion
Ideally, pilot studies of this nature should be based on classic randomized controlled trials, which are viewed as the gold standard for the evaluation of public policies. However, some critics argue that in practical application, randomized controlled trials "are subject to practical problems that undermine any claims to statistical or epistemic superiority." 15 Clearly, the pilot study described here falls short of the rigorous requirements of a formal randomized controlled trial, but it was not intended or conceived that way.
For one, hospitals were not randomly assigned to either the "treatment group"-that is, those that implement clinical pathways-or to the "control group." That approach would have been impractical at this stage of development of China's county-level hospital sector, especially in the less economically developed inland regions.
Furthermore, the early analyses of the project covered only a limited number of diseases. For some of them, enrollment rates in the clinical pathways had been below the government-set enrollment target rate of 70 percent of potentially eligible cases by disease. 16 Although enrollment rates have improved, they still fall short of the government target rate at many of the pilot-project hospitals. At Hanbin First, as of December 31, 2012, 46.5 percent (4,823) of all inpatients were enrolled in clinical-pathway treatment; 85 percent (4,106) of those enrolled were successfully treated and discharged; and clinical-pathway patients accounted for 39.5 percent of the 10,373 discharges in 2012. 12 At Yiyang People's, as of August 2012, clinical-pathway enrollment reached 65 percent; for Wuzhi Chinese, it reached 62.4 percent as of the end of the first quarter in 2012. 13, 14 Even as pilot hospitals have endeavored to increase the rate of patient enrollment in clinical pathways, the hospitals have continued to expand the total number of pathways offered. As of January 2013, Hanbin First had 70 clinical pathways in place, Qiangjiang Central had 42, and Wuzhi Chinese had 185. 7 For Yiyang People's, the number of diseases under clinicalpathway management reached 188, with 196 clinical pathways.
14 Thus, except for Qiangjiang Central, the government's target number of having fifty clinical pathways in operation at pilot hospitals in 2012 was exceeded.
As noted earlier, not all patients with diagnoses for which clinical pathways exist are actually enrolled in them, because patients are free to refuse participation in the pilot. This patient choice might beget the potential of selection bias, although great efforts have been made in the study to reduce a hospital's discretion to classify patients as either clinical-pathway or non-clinical-pathway cases.
In this pilot study, the case payments were pegged largely on what hospitals billed under the fee-for-service method of payment before the pilot began. Therefore, the case payments should not be confused with the evidence-based, "bundled" per case payments now being discussed among US policy analysts and introduced in Medicare. The case payments in this study were set as they were mainly to protect hospitals from the potential loss in revenue they might experience under a switch from pre-pilot treatments to typically more efficient, evidence-based clinical pathways-for example, if the case payments reflected clinical-pathway treatments priced out at fee-for-service rates (Exhibit 1). It is probably only a matter of time, however, before China moves gradually to evidence-based case payments-that is, payments based on best clinical practices and actual production costs, rather than the generous case payments based on preset billings that were used in the pilot studies.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to report how China seeks to implement facets of its major health reform and to present some early, encouraging results from an important and expanding pilot study on the use of evidence-based clinical pathways in county hospitals.
The results so far are encouraging Chinese health policy makers to expand the pilot program to county hospitals in other regions in China and ultimately nationwide, as the original design, discussed earlier, called for. The pilot model has been transformed into the "3 þ 1" reform model, where the "3" refers to three external reform measures-payment reform through risk sharing of surplus and loss with case payments, standardization of medical service technology through clinical pathways, and intrahospital and external monitoring and management of quality and cost; and the "1" refers to intrahospital evaluation and distribution of performance bonuses and fines.
As part of China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-15), the implementation of the "3 þ 1" reform model is now taking place in Health XI areas and beyond. The model's methodology has been incorporated into the county-level medical institutions comprehensive reform plan, according to Minister Chen of the Chinese Ministry of Health. 3 As of late 2012, Minister Chen and ministers of other related ministries had recognized the pilot as one of the best practices of county public hospital reforms. 7 China's policy makers hope that over the longer run, evidence-based clinical pathways will help contain the rapid growth of health spending in China. But even if clinical pathways prove incapable of making much of a dent in that growth by themselves, an equally important goal is to improve the quality of health care obtained for whatever is being spent-that is, to increase the cost-effectiveness of health care in China.
To that end, one can view evidence-based clinical pathways, along with the practice guidelines on which they are based, as ideal conduits for teaching medical practitioners and their staff about best clinical practices in their field. In a country as vast and varied as is China, that is a major advantage. ▪
The author thanks the Ministry of Health of China for making data available; and Yu Dezhi, director-general of the China National Health Development Research Center (CNHDRC), for making data available and clarifying the author's queries on the data. The author also thanks Yu Baorong for clarifying her queries on the 2011 pilot results evaluation paper. The author has permission from the CNHDRC to use the data it provided and data given to author on site visits for this article. The UK Department for International Development, through Health Partners International, provided funding for the author's site visits and authorization to publish this article.
[Published online April 3, 2013.] China's policy makers hope that over the longer run, evidencebased clinical pathways will help contain the rapid growth of health spending.
